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COMMENT ON BAKER’S AUTONOMY AND 
FREE SPEECH 
T.M. Scanlon* 
In approaching this comment I am conflicted in two ways. 
First, I have always been a great admirer of Ed Baker and his 
work, but I will be focusing mostly on those points on which we 
disagreed. Second, my relation to the autonomy theories of 
freedom of speech is ambiguous. I agree with Ed Baker in taking 
autonomy theories to be superior to democracy-based accounts, 
which are their main systemic rival, and I myself once offered a 
theory of freedom of expression that gave a central place to 
autonomy. But I have come to believe that theory to be 
mistaken in important respects, and, more generally, to believe, 
for reasons that I will explain, that the concept of autonomy is 
not a helpful one. 
The idea that there is a right of freedom of speech depends 
on the belief that important interests are threatened if the state 
has unregulated power to restrict expression. The interests in 
question are, on the surface at least, various. Some of these 
interests are political in the sense of having to do with elections, 
legislation and so forth. These include, at least, the interests of 
participants’ expression in having opportunities to criticize 
public officials, to influence public policy and legislation, and to 
participate in electoral politics. Beyond these narrowly political 
interests, people also have interests in having opportunities to 
communicate with others who share their values having to do 
with art, religion, science, philosophy, sex and other important 
aspects of personal life, and in having opportunities to express 
these values to others who may not share them, in hopes of 
influencing them, and thereby shaping the mores of their society, 
or just in order to bear witness to these values by giving them 
public expression. People also have interests, as audience 
members, in having access to information and opinion and to 
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expression by others on all the subjects I have listed. Finally, 
people have interests, as third parties, in having the political, 
economic, and social benefits of a society in which our fellow 
citizens’ participant and audience interests are fulfilled. 
One central task of theoretical reflection on freedom of 
speech is that of clarifying these interests: understanding what 
they are, why they are important, and in what ways they are at 
stake when restrictions on expression are in question. Two types 
of theories offer systematic characterizations of these interests. 
Democracy-based theories identify the interests at stake in 
freedom of expression as based in the preconditions of 
democratic government, or in the conditions required for us to 
fulfill our roles as citizens. Autonomy-based theories identify 
these interests as reflecting the value of individual autonomy, 
and see the right of freedom of speech as something required by 
respect for autonomy. 
Systematic accounts offer two possible advantages. First, 
they may provide a more secure foundation for freedom of 
speech by grounding the interests in question in a single value 
that it is more difficult to doubt or deny. Second, by providing a 
unified account of these apparently diverse interests they may 
provide a clearer understanding of their nature and importance, 
which may provide guidance in cases in which they need to be 
balanced against one another or against other concerns. 
Democracy-based theories in particular can seem appealing 
for the first of these reasons. By grounding the restrictions on 
majority rule that a right of freedom of expression involves in 
the conditions of legitimacy of the democratic process itself, they 
counter the objection that these restrictions are illegitimate 
because they are “counter-majoritarian.” I agree with Ed 
Baker’s conclusion that, despite this appeal, democracy-based 
theories cannot account for the full range of expressive activities 
protected by freedom of speech. The requirements of 
democratic rule comprise one important class of interests 
protected by freedom of speech. But they are not the whole 
story.1 An autonomy-based theory does much better in this 
regard. All, or at least almost all, of the interests I listed above as 
being at stake in freedom of speech could plausibly be called 
interests in autonomy. So in that respect the position I want to 
defend could be called an autonomy-based theory, in contrast to 
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a democracy-based theory. Such a theory—one based simply on 
the importance of protecting and advancing these interests—
would, if I understand him correctly, be what Baker calls a 
substantive autonomy theory.2 Calling all of these diverse 
interests matters of autonomy strikes me as not very helpful.  
But Baker’s use of this term goes beyond this labeling of 
interests. The formal autonomy theory he advocates holds that 
although “promoting substantive autonomy, along with matters 
of collective self-definition, should be a major aim of the state 
and the legal order,” the “pursuit of this and other state aims 
should only use means that respect a more formal conception of 
autonomy of each person.”3 This formal conception of autonomy 
“consists of a person’s authority (or right) to make decisions 
about herself—her own meaningful actions and usually her use 
of her resources—as long as her actions do not block others’ 
similar authority or rights.”4 The requirement to respect formal 
autonomy thus operates as a “side constraint” on governmental 
policies aimed to promote substantive autonomy or other goods.5 
When does a government policy fail to respect formal 
autonomy? The most obvious examples would be cases of 
attempted “thought control” in which governments attempt to 
interfere with individuals’ thought processes. The requirement of 
respect that Baker has in mind would rule out such 
interventions, but it would also demand more. Autonomy as he 
understands it includes not only exercising the capacity for 
making up one’s own mind but also “self-expressive rights that 
include, for example, a right to seek to persuade or unite or 
associate with others—or to offend, expose, condemn, or 
disassociate with them.”6 Expressive activities count as exercises 
of formal autonomy, however, only if they involve the honest 
representation of what the speaker believes to be true. Lies and 
threats are thus excluded. 
So not every policy that limits expressive activities 
disrespects formal autonomy. Expressive activities can be 
restricted (without disrespecting formal autonomy), Baker says, 
when these activities would otherwise interfere with the formal 
autonomy of others. “Generally,” he says, “respect for auto-
nomy involves respect for a person’s choices about herself and, 
 
 2. Id. at 272. 
 3. Id. at 253–54 (emphasis added). 
 4. Id. at 254. 
 5. Id. at 253. 
 6. Id. at 254. 
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maybe, her resources up until her choice involves taking choice 
away from another about himself or his resources.”7 Expressive 
activities are not purely “self-regarding.” They can affect others 
and can make them worse off. It matters, however, in what way 
these harms occur. One person’s speech cannot be restricted on 
the ground that it harms others by persuading them of things 
that are false or bad, but can be restricted on other grounds, such 
as when it involves threats, coercion or violence.8 
The common thread here is that government disrespects the 
formal autonomy of its citizens when it substitutes its judgment 
for their own and restricts expression on this basis. When 
government restricts a person’s speech on grounds other than its 
effect on others, it is doing so on what it judges to be the merits 
of the thoughts expressed, and is thus failing to respect the 
judgment, and hence the formal autonomy, of the speaker. 
When it restricts speech on the ground that it harms others by 
persuading them to adopt mistaken attitudes, government fails 
to respect the judgment, hence the formal autonomy, of those 
who are so affected. 
I myself once proposed a theory of freedom of expression 
that had as its centerpiece a similar autonomy-based side 
constraint on the harms that can justify the regulation of 
expression.9 I later rejected this theory because this restriction 
seemed to me too tight. It fails to distinguish between 
restrictions on political speech, justified by the alleged fact that it 
would lead citizens to form mistaken views about the wisdom of 
governmental policies, and restrictions on cigarette advertising, 
or false and misleading advertising for other products.10 All of 
these justifications involve an element of “substituted 
judgment,” but they are not all illegitimate. 
In order to determine which are and which are not 
legitimate, we need to take into account the various interests 
that individuals have in the forms of expression and kinds of 
information in question, and the degree to which these interests 
would be threatened by government regulation.11 In the case of 
 
 7. Id. at 257–58. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
204, 213–15 (1972), reprinted in T.M. SCANLON, THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE 6, 14–
15 (2003). 
 10. See T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 
U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 534 (1979), reprinted in THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE, supra 
note 9, at 84. 
 11. The same is true of paternalistic legislation restricting behavior other than 
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allegedly false or misleading expression regarding political 
issues, individuals’ interests, both as potential speakers and 
potential audiences, are very significant, and the danger is great 
that the power to regulate expression on these grounds, if it were 
granted, would be misused in a partisan way that would damage 
these interests. On the other hand, the interests of sellers of 
goods in having greater opportunities to influence potential 
buyers are less urgent.12 The interest of buyers in the information 
they may get from advertising varies from case to case, and is in 
some cases not insignificant, although not as urgent as 
comparable interests in political speech. And, finally, there is 
less reason than in the case of political speech to believe that 
governmental powers to ban false and misleading commercial 
advertising would be overused in ways that would threaten these 
interests. Not that there is no reason to be concerned about 
regulation in this case, but certainly there is less reason. 
It is instructive to compare this approach to commercial 
speech, based on calculations about what is required to protect 
interests in what Baker calls substantive autonomy, with Baker’s 
more wholesale account, based on formal autonomy. On the 
speakers’ side, Baker says that when legally constituted business 
entities engage in communication, “the moral/constitutional 
autonomy-based justification for protecting speech of flesh and 
blood people is simply not at stake here.”13 This seems to me 
correct, although I would put the point in terms of interests. The 
function of free speech principles is to protect the interests of 
individuals, as potential speakers, audiences and bystanders, and 
the relevant speaker-related interests are not at issue in 
commercial speech. 
But there are also audience interests to be considered. On 
this side, Baker writes, “The instrumental value that a listener 
places in her responsiveness to the persuasiveness of commercial 
speech or a gun to her head contrasts to the substantive or 
 
expression. Such legislation always involves an element of substituted judgment, but it is 
not for that reason always objectionable. Whether it is objectionable depends on the 
reasons individuals have for wanting certain aspects of their lives to depend on the 
choices they make under certain conditions, and the costs, including symbolic costs, of 
having these choices made by others. For more detailed discussion see T.M. SCANLON, 
WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 251–56 (1998). 
 12. In saying that these interests are “less urgent” I mean that they have less 
justificatory weight in determining what laws or policies are justified. This is not to deny 
that some people may in fact care more about what they buy than about whether they 
can vote. See T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655, 655–69 (1975), 
reprinted in THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE, supra note 9, at 70–83. 
 13. Baker, supra note 1, at 273. 
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solidarity value a listener places in her response to a solicitation 
for contribution. In second circumstance, but not the first, the 
listener comes to value the recipient having that with which she 
parts. And the speaker in the charitable solicitation seeks to 
persuade the listener on agreement in values while in the 
commercial speech or gun case only seeks behavior that the 
listener now instrumentally values because of how the speaker 
has changed her options.”14 This seems to me overly broad. 
Whatever the motives of advertisers may be, consumers do have 
reason to value information that they receive from advertising, 
about relative prices, technical details of products, and matters 
of style and fashion. These audience interests can be enhanced 
by regulation that makes this information more reliable (such as 
laws against false and misleading advertising) but they can also 
be threatened by over-regulation (such as outright bans on 
advertising, enacted at the behest of companies with dominant 
market share). So, while commercial speech differs from political 
speech in important ways, audience interests of the kind that 
freedom of speech is designed to protect are still in play. 
If, then, I could be called an autonomy theorist, this is 
because the interests that I take to lie at the heart of freedom of 
speech might all be called interests in substantive autonomy. 
This label does not, however, seem to me helpful, particularly 
because it is important to recognize the diversity of the interests 
in question. 
Bringing all of these interests under the general category of 
autonomy might, however, seem to offer an advantage of the 
first kind I mentioned at the beginning of this comment, the 
advantage of providing those interests with a secure normative 
foundation. If we cannot help seeing ourselves as autonomous—
as making up our own minds what to think—then we might seem 
to be committed to the conditions required for us to do this, and 
hence to requirements of freedom of expression. 
But even if the premise of this argument is accepted, it 
delivers less than might appear. It is true that we cannot avoid 
making up our own minds what to think, on whatever evidence is 
available to us that we deem relevant. Even in taking someone 
else’s word for a matter, we are making up our own minds in this 
sense, by deciding to take that person’s word for it. But as this 
example illustrates, even if we are committed to our own 
autonomy in this sense, nothing follows about how much we 
 
 14. Id. at 273–74. 
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should be prepared to give up in order to put ourselves in a 
better position to make up our minds about any particular 
question. The answer to this, as I have argued in my comment on 
Seana Shiffrin’s paper, depends on the subject matter in 
question. 
So the best account of freedom of speech seems to me to be 
neither democracy-based, nor autonomy-based, but irreducibly 
pluralist. 
 
